Abstract. Improved meet-in-the-middle cryptanalysis with efficient tabulation technique has been shown to be a very powerful form of cryptanalysis against SPN block ciphers. However, few literatures show the effectiveness of this cryptanalysis against Balanced-Feistel-Networks (BFN) and Generalized-Feistel-Networks (GFN) ciphers due to the stagger of affected trail and special truncated differential trail. In this paper, we describe a versatile and powerful algorithm for searching the best improved meet-in-the-middle distinguisher with efficient tabulation technique on word-oriented BFN and GFN block ciphers, which is based on recursion and greedy algorithm. To demonstrate the usefulness of our approach, we show key recovery attacks on 14/16-round CLEFIA-192/256 which are the best attacks. We also propose key recovery attacks on 13/15-round Camellia-192/256 (without F L/F L −1 ).
Introduction
The meet-in-the-middle attack was first proposed by Diffie and Hellman to attack DES [7] . In recent years, it was widely researched due to its effectiveness against block cipher AES [4] . For AES, Gilbert and Minier showed in [10] a collision attack on 7-round AES. At FSE 2008, Demirci and Selçuk improved the Gilbert and Minier attack using meet-in-the-middle technique instead of collision ideas [5] . At ASIACRYPT 2010, Dunkelman, Keller and Shamir improved Dermirci and Selçuk attacks on 7-round AES-192 and 8-round AES-256 by introducing the idea of multiset and differential enumeration technique in [8] . Further more, Derbez, Fouque and Jean presented a significant improvement of Dunkelman et al. attack at EUROCRYPT 2013 [6] , called efficient tabulation technique. Using the rebound-like idea, they showed that many values in precomputation table are not reached at all under the constraint of the truncated differential trail. At FSE 2014, Li et al. proposed key-dependent sieve technique to attack 9-round AES-192 [13] .
In [14] , Lin et al. defined the T -δ-set which is a special set of states and the S-multiset which is a multiset of S cells. Then using these definitions, they got the least spread T -δ-set which has the minimum number of active cells and af f ected-cell-set which is affected by the minimun number of active cells 3 . After that, they introduced a general algorithm for searching the best affected trail from a T -δ-set to an S-multiset, and found that building a better affected trail is equivalent to a positive integer optimization problem.
Although pnew results on Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPN) block ciphers using improved meet-in-the-middle attack with efficient tabulation technique were given in many literatures, few results were proposed on BalancedFeistel-Networks (BPN) [11] and Generalized-Feistel-Networks (GFN) [19] . This is due to the stagger of affected trail and truncated differential trail in the precomputation phase.
Our contribution. In this paper, we describe a versatile and powerful algorithm for searching the best improved meet-in-the-middle distinguisher with efficient tabulation technique on word-oriented BFN and GFN block ciphers. This algorithm is based on recursion and greedy algorithm. Given an affected trail D from a T -δ-set to an S-multiset by the algorithm of [14] , our algorithm is made up of two phase: table construction phase and searching phase.
The table construction phase is based on the precomputation phase Fouque et al. proposed in [9] . In this phase, we build a graph G that contains all the 2-equipartite directed acyclic graph of all the possible one-round transitions.
The searching phase is based on the algorithm Matsui proposed to find the best differential characteristics for DES [18] . Our algorithm works by recursion and can be seen as a tree traversal in a depth-first manner. One truncated differential trail is a path in this tree, and its weight equals the product of all traversed edges. We are looking for the path with the minimum number of guessed-cells in this tree under certain transition probability. The knowledge of the previous best truncated differential trail allows pruning during the procedure. To speed up this algorithm, We also use greedy algorithm to divide the search into 2 parts.
To demonstrate the usefulness of our approach, we apply our algorithm to CLEFIA-192/256 [20] and 
. For CLEFIA-256, we propose a 10-round distinguisher, then give a 16-round key recovery attack with data complexity of 2 121.5 chosen-plaintexts, time complexity of 2 203.5 encryptions and memory complexity of 2 201.5 128-bit blocks. To the best of our knowledge, this is currently the best attack with respect to the number of attacked rounds. For CLEFIA-192, we propose a 9-round distinguisher, then give a 14-round key recovery attack with data complexity of 2 121.5 chosen-plaintexts, time complexity of 2 139.5 encryptions and memory complexity of 2 137.5 128-bit blocks. To the best of our knowledge, this is currently the best attack with respect to the attack complexity.
We also propose an 8-round distinguisher on Camellia*-192, then give a 13-round key recovery attack with data complexity of 2 113 chosen-plaintexts, time complexity of 2 180 encryptions and memory complexity of 2 130 128-bit blocks. For Camellia*-256, we propose a 9-round distinguisher, then give a 15-round key recovery attack with data complexity of 2 113 chosen-plaintexts, time complexity of 2 244 encryptions and memory complexity of 2 194 128-bit blocks. Although Lu et al. proposed a 14-round attack on Camellia*-192 and a 16-round attack on Camellia*-256 [17] , they didn't consider the whitening operations. So we think our works on Camellia* are quite meaningful.
We present here a summary of our attack result on CLEFIA and Camellia*, and compare them to the best attacks known for them. This summary is given in Table 1 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides notations and definitions used throughout this paper, then gives a brief review of the algorithm to build the affected trail. Section 2 also gives the general attack scheme, and discusses the distinguisher on Feistel schemes with efficient tabulation technique. We provide the automatic search tool to search the best improved meet-in-themiddle distinguisher with efficient tabulation technique on Feistel schemes in Section 3. Our attacks on CLEFIA-192/256 and Camellia*-192/256 are described in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
Preliminaries
In this section, we give notations used throughout this paper, then briefly review the approach presented in [14] , after that give the attack scheme. Finally, we discuss the improved meet-in-the-middle distinguisher on Feistel schemes with efficient tabulation technique.
Notation
The following notation will be used throughout this paper (the size is counted in number of cells):
-b: block size.
-k: the size of the master key. 
Reviews of Former Worksp
In [14] , Lin et al. gave the algorithm to search the affected trail. In this subsection, we briefly review the definitions and algorithms they gave.
The improved meet-in-the-middle distinguisher is based on particular structures of messages captured by Definition 1 and 2.
Definition 1 (T -δ-set). T -δ-set is a set of 2 T ×c states that are all different in T cells (the active cells) and all equal in the other cells (the inactive cells), where c is the number of bits in a cell and T ≤ b.
Definition 2 (S-M ultiset). S-multiset is an unordered set in which elements can occur many times, and every element of the S-multiset consists of S cells, S ≤ b.
In this paper, T presents T -δ-set and S presents S-M ultiset. With these two definitions in mind, we canp choose proper values of |T | and |S| [14] .
The searching algorithm is based on a propagation-then-pruning method as shown in Fig. 1 . Suppose we have one (T, S) pair, the building of an affected trail D is as follows: 1. Propagation. In the forward direction, differences of T can propagate from one round to the next. We need to guess the active cells going through the S-box layer, then get S by this trail. 2. Pruning. In this trail, some guessed-cells have nothing to do with the building of S. These cells are pruned from the trail.
Using this algorithm, we can get an affected trail D for (T, S).
Attack Scheme
In this subsection, we present our new unified view of the single-key meet-inthe-middle attack, where R rounds of the block cipher can be split into three consecutive parts of r 1 , r, and r 2 . The general attack uses two successive phases as shown in Fig. 2 .
The trail to get multiset from δ-Set in the online phase.
The trail to get the special truncated differential characteristics in the online phase.
The special truncated differential trail in the precomputation phase.
Affected trail in the precomputation phase.
The guessed-cells in the affected trail. The extra guessed-cells to get the special truncated differential trail.
The cells do not need to be guessed due to the differential property of S. Precomputation phase 1. In the precomputation phase, we build an affected trail from T to S by guessing some cells. 2. Use efficient tabulation technique to build a special truncated differential trail from T * to one middle round, then build a truncated differential trail from S * to another middle round in the reverse direction. This step needs to guess some more cells. With the differential property of S [6] , we can prune some guessed-cells made in step 1. 3. Build a lookup table L containing all the possible trail constructed from T to S. Online phase 1. In the online phase, we need to identify a T -δ-set containing a message m verifying the desired property. This is done by using a large number of plaintexts and ciphertexts, and expecting that for each key candidate, there is one pair of plaintexts satisfying the truncated differential trail from P → T * and C → S * . m is one member of this plaintext pair. Then use m to build a T -δ-set. 2. Finally, we partially decrypt the associated T -δ-set through the last r 2 rounds and check whether it belongs to L.
Feistel Ciphers with Efficient Tabulation Technique
In this paper, we focus on the application of efficient tabulation technique on BFN and GFN. The round functions F of them arep made up of 3 layers: key addition layer, the S-box layer and the linear transformation layer. This is true for most of BFN and GFN ciphers. The advantage of improved meet-in-the-middle attack with efficient tabulation technique on Feistel ciphers is that it can use the differential property of S in b n×o rounds. We take CLEFIA [20] as an example. CLEFIA is a 4-branch type-2 GFN cipher with b = 16, n = 2 and o = 4.
As shown in Fig. 3 (A) ,
). If we know ∆x i and ∆x i+2 , using the differential property of S, we can get the active bytes of y i [0]. Using the same method, if we know ∆x i and ∆x i+2 , we can get the active bytes of y i [2] , y i+1 [0] and y i+1 [2] as well. So if we get the special truncated differential trail, we can prune some guessed-cells.
However, things are just not as what we think. For SPN ciphers, affected trail and truncated differential trail are almost the same. But for BFN and GFN ciphers, they differ a lot from each other. We also take CLEFIA as an example. As shown in Fig. 3 (B) , the guessed-cells of affected trail and truncated differential trail are totally different. For dependent trail, we only need to guess y i [2] . For truncated differential trail, we need to guess y i+1 [2] [0] and
To solve this problem, we present an automatic search tool in Section 3 to search the best improved meet-in-the-middle distinguisher with efficient tabulation technique on GFN and BFN. 
The Automatic Search Tool using Efficient Tabulation Technique
In this section, we present a practical algorithm for deriving the best improved meet-in-the-middle distinguisher on Feistel schemes in terms of efficient tabulation technique, which combines the precomputation phase of [9] and the search procedure of [18] . Suppose we have the affected trail Section 2.2 gives, our tool works by recursion and consists on 2 phases: table construction phase and searching phase.
Table Construction Phase
As shown in [9] , the table construction phase builds a graph G that contains all the 2-equipartite directed acyclic graph of all the possible one-round transitions. This graph can be built and stored efficiently by observing its inner structure: the block cipher internal state output depends only on the block cipher internal state input. Unlike [9] , since we don't consider the key schedule, the graph is small and we can store it in truncated differential characteristic 5 . A toy example of G is shown in Fig. 4 .
We should build a graph G −1 that contains all the 2-equipartite directed acyclic graph of all the possible one-round transitions in the backward direction as well.
Searching Phase
As the algorithm in [18] , our searching phase find the best n-round improved meet-in-the-middle distinguisher. The algorithm works by recursion and can be seen as a tree traversal in a depth-first manner, where the tree presents all 
the possible truncated differential trail in the cipher layered by round. The nodes present the truncated differential characteristics and the edges the possible transitions between them, and are labeled by their numbers of guessed-cells and transition probabilities. One truncated differential trail is a path in this tree, and its weight equals the product of all traversed edges. We are looking for the path with the minimum number of guessed-cells in this tree under certain transition probability. The knowledge of the previous best truncated differential trail allows pruning during the procedure. Since we only consider truncated differential characteristic and the pruning is very efficient, the running time will not be so long.
As analyzed in Section 2.4, the advantage of efficient tabulation technique on Feistel schemes is that it can guess less cells in the middle b n×o rounds using a special truncated differential trail. However, since the stagger of affected trail and truncated differential trail, we can only limit parts of values in the affected trail.
3.2.1 Trail Probability. Almost all the truncated differential trails used in the distinguisher on SPN ciphers are with probability 1. In our algorithm, we consider the truncated differential trail with probability less than 1, which means we can guess less extra cells. Suppose we guess one less cell in the backward direction (with probability 2 −c ), it may cause less extra cells to be guessed. Getting a trail with probability 2
−c means that we should repeat the online phase 2 c times. So our algorithm require an "initial value" for the minimum trail probability, which is presented as P . This value can be determined by analyzing the online phase.
Comparing Trails.
Next we introduce a (quasi-)order relation for 2 truncated differential trail T 1 and T 2 as follows:
Definition 3 ( ). T 1 is better than T 2 if and only if it has less guessed-cells or its probability is higher with the same number of guessed-cells, i.e.
3.2.3 Ending Condition. Given key length k, probability lower bound P and the best trail so far T best , we define ending condition E as follows:
If a trail belongs to E, we should stop the search procedure and try another trail.
Finding the Best Trail.
Although we could test all the truncated differential trail under the probability lower bound P to find the best one, we have a more efficient way using the greedy algorithm. Since the affected trail is unique for each (S, T ) pair, we can find out b n×o successive rounds which need to guess more cells than others. This means that we can use the differential property of S to prune more guessed-cells. If the number of these successive rounds is more than one, we present the beginning of these rounds as a set called SR-set.
With SR-set in mind, we can divide the search procedure into 2 parts: one starts at the first round from the forward direction, the other starts at the last round from the backward direction. This algorithm will divide an r-round truncated differential trail search into 2 parts of r 1 and r 2 , where r = r 1 + r 2 + b n×o .
At the beginning of the algorithm, we should decrease G(D) by the number of guessed-cells in the middle b n×o rounds. Then at the end of the search for one trail, increase the number of guessed-cells that the truncated differential trail can't prune in these b n×o rounds . After that, we could get the exact number of guessed-cells in this trail.
Although the first and the last truncated differential characteristics in the trail can take any values, we put some limitations on them by some observations. Since there is little difference between an affected trail and a truncated differential trail on the first r 1 -round, we fix the first truncated differential characteristic to T . And by the propagation of differences, we constrain values of the last truncated differential characteristics S * with |S * | ≤ |S|. The framework of our algorithm for the first r 1 and the last r 2 rounds is now established by Algorithm 1 and 2 including essentially recursive calls.
The inputs of Algorithm 1 and 2 are affected trail D, input truncated differential trail T , best truncated differential trail T best , probability lower bound P and graph G/G −1 . The sorting algorithm of line 3 in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 is according to . Find all truncated values this trail can lead to in graph G
3:
Sort these truncated differential characteristics 4: for all truncated differential characteristics do
5:
Add this characteristic to T 6:
if i < r 1 − 1 then
8:
Call Procedure Round begin i+1
9:
for all truncated differences S * satisfying |S * | ≤ |S| do
11:
Call Procedure Round We can loop through all possible (T, S) pairs to find the best r-round distinguisher under P , then find r max = max{r|P(T best ) > P and G(T best ) < k}.
Applications
In this section, we propose our attacks on CLEFIA-192/256 and Camellia*-192/256.
Applications to CLEFIA-192/256
CLEFIA is a lightweight 128-bit block cipher designed by Shirai et al. in 2007 [20] and based in a 4-branch type-2 GFN. It is adopted as an international ISO/IEC 29192 standard in lightweight cryptography. We refer to [20] for a detail description.
4.1.1 9/10-Round Distinguisher on CLEFIA. First, we use our search tool to find the best 10-round distinguisher on CLEFIA-256 and 9-round distinguisher on CLEFIA-192, they are shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 . Find all truncated values this trail can lead to in graph G −1
3:
5:
if i < r 2 − 1 then
8:
Call Procedure Round end i+1
if Combining 2 parts of T together leads to a trail then
11:
Increase G(T )
12:
T best ← T In the attack of CLEFIA, we apply an equivalent transformation to the 10-round and 9-round distinguishers, as shown in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 . Namely, the right linear transformations of round i + 8 and i + 7 are removed from these rounds, and linear transformations are added to three different positions in order to obtain distinguishers that are computationally equivalent to the original one.
The 10-round distinguisher on CLEFIA-256 is based on the proposition below. Initial T best with k and P
3:
Get the SR-set from D
4:
for all r 1 in SR-set do Round-i
Round-i+1
Round-i+2
Round-i+3
Round-i+5
Round-i+6
Round-i+7
Round-i+8 multiset Active bytes of affected trail. Guessed-bytes of affected trail.
Active bytes of truncated differential trail. Extra guessed-bytes of truncated differential trail.
F0 F1
Round-i+4
We use the differential property of S in these 2 rounds Proof. As shown in Fig. 5 , we first consider the affected trail from
. This affected trail is determined by 39-byte intermediate variable:
This can be easily seen from the figure. Furthermore, if there exists a message of the (1-)δ-set belongs to a pair which conforms the truncated differential trail as in Fig. 5 , the 35-byte variable
is determined by 22-byte variable:
, we can deduce ∆x i+4 . In the backward direction, using ∆x i+10 [2] [0], [2] [0],we can deduce ∆x i+6 . By the differential property of S, this can deduce Round-i
Round-i+1
F0 F1
We use the differential property of S in these 2 rounds In conclusion, the corresponding (1-)multisets of byte x i+10 [1] [0] only take about 2 208 values with the truncated differential trail.
The 9-round distinguisher on CLEFIA-192 is based on the proposition below.
Proposition 2. Considering to encrypt 2 8 values of the (1-)δ-set through 9-round CLEFIA-192 starting from round-i, where x i [1] [0] is the active byte, in the case of that a message of the δ-set belongs to a pair which conforms to the truncated differential trail outlined in Fig. 6 , then the corresponding (1-)multisets of x i+9 [1] [0] only take about 2 144 values.
The proof of this proposition is the same as before and shown in Fig. 6 .
16/14-Round
Attack on CLEIFA-256/192. Based on the 10-round distinguisher, we extend 3 rounds on the top and 3 rounds on the bottom to present the 16-round improved meet-in-the-middle attack on CLEFIA-256, and based on the 9-round distinguisher, we extend 3 rounds on the top and 2 rounds on the bottom to present the 14-round improved meet-in-the-middle attack on CLEFIA-192. The procedure of this attack is shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 . The linear transformation in round 13/12 is moved to two different positions as shown in Fig. 7 and 9 . The newly-introduced P −1 and the P before [2] generated by the distinguisher cancel each other, we therefore ignore them.
The following proposition is important in finding the special truncated differential trail. This is because the linearity of M C. We call the set of 2 8 differences that results in (a, 0, 0, 0) after linear transformation layer the α-set which is marked by red triangle in Fig. 9 .
The detail attack is shown below: 48 partial encryptions/decrytions of a δ-set. We evaluate the time complexity of this part to 2 144+48+8−5 = 2 195 encryptions. In conclusion, the data complexity is 2 121.5 chosen-plaintexts, the time complexity is 2 203.5 encryptions and the memory complexity is 2 201.5 128-bit blocks by a trade-off [13] . The 14-round attack on CLEFIA-192 is shown in Fig. 8 . The procedure is almost the same as the former attack. The data complexity is 2 121.5 chosenplaintexts, the time complexity is 2 139.5 encryptions and the memory complexity is 2 137.5 128-bit blocks.
Applications to Camellia*-192/256
Camellia is a 128-bit block cipher designed by Aoki et al. in 2000 [1] . It is a Feistel-like construction where two key-dependent layer F L and F L −1 are ap- Round-12
The guessed-bytes on Detecting the Right Pair phase.
The trail to find the right pair.
The extra guessed-bytes on Creating and Checking the δ-set phase.
The trail to build the muliset in the backward direction. Fig. 9 . In this distinguisher, we modify the method [14] gives, and let the multiset can take place after the permutation. Then use this modified tool to search the affected trail. This idea is inspired by [12] .
By guessing In a word, the multiset of byte P −1 (x i+7 [0]) [5] can be determined by 16-byte variable.
The online phase of this attack is the same as the 12-round attack on Camellia-192 in [12] . So we can extend 2 rounds on the top and 3 rounds on the bottom to build a 13-round attack on Camellia*-192 with the time complexity of 2 180 encryption, the data complexity of 2 113 chosen plaintexts and the memory complexity of 2 130 128-bit block.
4.2.2
Attack on Camellia*-256. For the distinguisher of Camellia-256, we simply extend one round after round-(i + 3) by simply guessing the whole 8-byte state after key addition layer. Then we can get a 10-round distinguisher on Camellia-256.
In the online phase, we simply extend one round after the distinguisher by guessing all the 8-byte state after key addition layer. Then we can build a 15-round attack on Camellia*-256 with the time complexity of 2 244 encryption, the data complexity of 2 113 chosen plaintexts and the memory complexity of 2
194
128-bit block.
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper has shown the improved meet-in-the-middle distinguisher with efficient enumeration technique on BFN and GFN. We discussed the problem why this technique was rarely used on the attacks of BFN and GFN, then described a versatile and powerful algorithm for searching the best improved meet-in-themiddle distinguisher with efficient tabulation technique on them, which is based on recursion and greedy algorithm.
To demonstrate the usefulness and versatility of our approach, we showed several attacks on block ciphers including CLEFIA and Camellia*. Among them, we would like to stress that the presented attack on 14/16-round reduced CLEFIA-192/256 are the best attacks. Since our approach is generic, it is expected to be applied to other BFN and GFN ciphers. We believe that our results are useful not only for a deeper understanding the security of the Feistel schemes, but also for designing a secure block cipher. 
